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The Debt-for-Nature Swap: A Long-
Term Investment for the Economic
Stability of Less Developed Countries
Many less developed countries (LDCs) are struggling to repay their loans from
foreign creditors. These LDCs borrow from two sources in order to service their
debts: (1) lending institutions; and (2) natural resources. A country "borrows"
from its natural resources when it indiscriminately cuts down trees in order to
increase the productivity necessary to generate export revenue. Unlike bank
loans, environmental loans come interest free. On the other hand, debt servicing
to a bank can, at least theoretically, last indefinitely by way of extensions or
restructurings. Such is not the case with nonrenewable environmental resources.
At some point the environmental bank will fold because its resources will be
tapped out. As a result, some incentive must be created to curtail the destruction
of the environment while providing an alternate method of debt-servicing. The
debt-for-nature swap, a process whereby LDC debt is exchanged for conserva-
tion measures on the part of an LDC, provides one promising solution. This
comment explores the evolution of debt-for-nature swaps, their impact to date,
and their potential for the future.
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I. History of the Debt Crisis
A. THE OIL SHOCKS
In 1973 the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) raised oil
prices by 400 percent.1 Unable to spend their billions in profits and unsure as to
whether these prices could be maintained, OPEC deposited $200 billion into the
world banking system. 2 While OPEC thrived from the "oil shock," LDCs suf-
fered from it and were unable to pay the increased oil prices. Foreign loans
became a necessity for the LDCs in order to meet the increased oil costs.
3
"Recycling" resulted as OPEC deposited surpluses into commercial banks, and
the commercial banks, in turn, lent the OPEC money to needy LDCs. 4 "Petro-
dollars" had mobility and freedom from national controls and therefore were
easily recycled. 5 The process seemed beneficial to both the banks and the LDCs
because most of the Third World countries were too poor or too unstable to get
commercial loans. The banks could earn higher profits from lending to the LDCs
because, as a rule, the poorer the country, the higher the interest rates and
charges the banks could impose.
6
In 1979 the second oil shock hit when OPEC again raised oil prices. 7 The
banks circulated another $200 billion from oil-importing nations to OPEC. 8
The LDCs needed larger loans to deal with the second shock, and once again
the world banking system proceeded to recycle funds. 9 At the same time,
interest rates doubled when the major industrialized nations decided to deal
with inflation through strict monetary policies.' 0 This increase in the dollar
interest rate was significant because the LDC loans were subject to variable
interest rates. Therefore, the higher the dollar interest rate, the higher the
charges on the LDCs' existing debts." LDC borrowing became mandatory as
1. Angermuller, Introduction, in SOVEREIGN LENDING: MANAGING LEGAL RISK Vii-Viii
(M. Gruson & R. Reisner eds. 1984).
2. Id.
3. See T. CONGDON, THE DEBT THREAT 112 (1988); see also A. SAMPSON, THE MONEY LEND-
ERS 175-76 (1981).
4. See C.G. LANGONI, THE DEVELOPMENT CRISIS: BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE 14 (1987).
5. The OPEC deposits were short-term deposits, however, and could be withdrawn without notice.
For a more detailed discussion of the recycling process, see A. SAMPSON, supra note 3, at 153.
6. Id. at 176; see also T. CONGDON, supra note 3, at 112.
7. Prices rose to more than 1500 percent of their 1973 level. Angermuller, supra note 1, at viii.
8. Id.
9. See Id. Actually, sovereign lending was successful until this second shock. T. CONGDON,
supra note 3, at 116.
10. Angermuller, supra note 1, at ix. For more on the actions of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board,
see T. CONGDON, supra note 3, at 117-18; see also C.G. LANGONI, supra note 4, at 22-23.
11. T. CONGDON, supra note 3, at 118. The bank lending rates varied with the London interbank
offered rate (LIBOR), which in turn varied with dollar interest rates generally. The set rate was equal
to the LIBOR rate plus a margin based on the particular country risk. Id. at 113.
Interest rates were not the LDCs' only problem. OPEC had now decided to spend its money on its
own development rather than depositing it all into banks. In addition, the current account deficits of
VOL. 24, NO. 4
DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS 1073
a source of finance for balance-of-payments deficits rather than a source for
domestic investment.' 
2
B. THE FALSE SECURITY OF THE BANKS
While the oil shocks began to take effect, commercial bankers lent to LDCs
with the assumption that countries could not go bankrupt.' 3 Unfortunately, the
banks appraised the creditworthiness of LDCs according to criteria such as the
LDCs' debt-export and debt-servicing ratios. 14 The banks did not concern them-
selves with the uses of borrowed funds. 15 Furthermore, the banks did not seek
collateral for sovereign debt because there was no legal remedy for attaching it. 1
6
the LDCs increased and the price of commodities dropped by one third. While the LDCs were paying
out more money, their monetary inflow decreased. As a result, debt maturities proved to be too short.
See Angermuller, supra note 1, at viii-ix.
12. Increased investment by the debtor countries did not necessarily mean increased growth. As
a result, the credit extended by the banks eventually stopped contributing to economic growth (e.g.,
the purchase of capital goods). Rather, the LDCs began to use the borrowed funds to finance
balance-of-payments deficits resulting from excessive governmental expenditures and consumption.
T. CONGDON, supra note 1, at 115. These factors also contributed to decline in LDC exports. See
C.G. LANGONI, supra note 4, at 23-27.
13. The banks therefore lent dollars at only a modest margin over the LIBOR rate. See
T. CONGDON, supra note 3, at 114. Bankers rationalized that the geographical areas that nations
occupied could not vanish. Bankers also believed that governments would accept responsibility for
the financial obligations of their predecessors. Id.
14. LDCs must honor their debts in terms of another nation's currency. Therefore, an LDC's
ability to repay debt depends on its receipt of dollars and other hard currencies, which in turn depends
upon the LDC's export success. As a result, a creditor will consider an LDC's ratio of debt to exports
in order to determine that LDC's creditworthiness. Id. at 108. Countries such as Mexico, Brazil, and
Argentina seemed creditworthy to the banks because of their substantial industrial bases and eco-
nomic growth rates. These countries contained vast natural resources, which the banks considered to
be a source for growth. Note, Treasury Secretary James Baker's "Program for Sustained Growth"
for the International Debt Crisis: Three Steps Toward Global Financial Security, 4 DICK. J. INT'L L.
275, 277-78 (1986).
Lenders also relied on asset banking. They determined the value of the borrower's assets and
restricted lending to a proportion of that value. The ratio used depended on the quality and the
convertibility of the assets. Usually, the banks were willing to loan 60-80 percent of the asset value
because of the tendency for assets to increase in value. T. CONGDON, supra note 3, at 10.
15. T. CONGDON, supra note 3, at 113-14. The loans were not granted for specific projects or
industries. This type of lending was the difference between the commercial banks and the World
Bank, which subjected its debtors to much supervision. A debtor might wait three years for a World
Bank loan, whereas commercial bank loans came with "no strings attached" and with little delay.
See A. SAMPSON, supra note 3, at 177-80, 396. The LDCs preferred the leniency of the commercial
banks, and the banks liked the lower administration costs involved with this relaxed inspection. See
T. CONGDON, supra note 3, at 114; A. SAMPSON, supra note 3, at 176-77. Unfortunately, the
commercial bank loans often were wasted. See id. at 396.
16. "[T]he expectation of growth was the only collateral used at the time to secure loans to
developing countries." Meeson, Back to the Market: The Debt Problem in Legal Perspective, 12
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1988). Sovereign immunity, incorporation, and problems of enforcement
can distinguish domestic and foreign lender remedies. For a discussion of enforcement issues,
specifically the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the act of state doctrine, see A. KALETSKY,
THE COSTS OF DEFAULT 23-27 (1985); see also Howse, The Courts, the International Debt Crisis,
and the Dilemma of Rescheduling: Rethinking the Allied Bank Decision, 46 TORONTO FAC. L. REv.
578 (1988).
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II. Attempts at Solutions to the Crisis
A. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF TRADITIONAL APPROACHES
The lack of legal sanctions available against sovereign borrowers forced lend-
ers to find ways to deal with the crisis. 17 The Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee stated in 1977 that "[t]he viability of the whole international system is
premised on the assumption that all the players stay in the game."' 18 Initially,
lenders explored short-term financing projects along with temporary and multi-
year restructurings. Banks restructured LDC debt by rescheduling the principal
and increasing the interest margin. Often the borrower financed interest pay-
ments by obtaining new loans.19
Problems occurred with rescheduling because interest was added to old debt at
a faster rate than the debtor country's output or exports were growing. This
inevitably led to the need for further rescheduling. 20 Debt servicing drained
LDCs of financial resources that they might otherwise have used for domestic
investment. Economic growth was stunted, and the LDCs were unable to raise
exports. At the same time, commercial banks reduced "new money" lending to
the LDCs. 21 These factors combined to destroy the debtor country's ability to
service its debts.2 2 And so the vicious cycle continued. For some LDCs, interest
payments alone became an insupportable burden. 23
Banks eventually accepted the reality that LDCs might never service some of
their accumulated debt, and therefore searched for ways at least to minimize
losses. 24 In 1987 Citicorp began a trend among U.S. and foreign lending insti-
tutions when it set aside three billion dollars in reserves for anticipated losses in
its foreign loan portfolio.25 In June 1989 Washington regulators instructed U.S.
17. See A. SAMPSON, supra note 3, at 177.
18. Id. at 194 (quoting the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Staff Report, Aug. 1977, at 61).
19. For a more detailed discussion of the mechanics of a conventional restructuring agreement,
see Buchheit, Alternative Techniques in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 371,
372-73 [hereinafter Buchheit, Alternative Techniques]. See generally Barston, The International
Debt Crisis: Evolving Management Methods, 23 J. WORLD TRADE 69 (1989).
20. T. CONGDON, supra note 3, at 150; see also Buchheit, Debt Renegotiation: The Changing
Tactics of Sovereign Debt Restructuring, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Nov. 1987, at 35-36 [hereinafter
Buchheit, Debt Renegotiation].
21. T. CONGDON, supra note 3, at 150; Wallenstein & Silkenat, Investment Funds and Debt-
Equity Swaps: Broadening the Base of a New Financial Tool, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 8, 8 (1988).
22. T. CONGDON, supra note 3, at 150.
23. Buchheit, Debt Renegotiation, supra note 20, at 35; see also Buchheit, Alternative Tech-
niques, supra note 19, at 374.
24. S. Hansen, Debt for Nature Swaps 2 (Jan. 1988) (unpublished memorandum). In Sept. 1989
Brazil stopped servicing its foreign debt. See Brooke, Brazil's Economic Crossroads, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 12, 1989, at Cl. Likewise, Argentina has not paid interest on its $64 billion worth of debt in
two years. See Christian, Argentine Chief Clashes with Labor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1989, at A3;
Farnsworth, Third World Borrowing Still Rising, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1989, at Dl; see also
Remarks by William Rhodes at the Financial Executives Institute in New York City on Brazil's
moratorium in 1987 (Apr. 12, 1988) [hereinafter Remarks by Rhodes].
25. Glen, Debt Ball Is in Private Sector's Court, Am. Banker, Sept. 25, 1987, at 11.
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banks to classify Argentine loans as "value impaired," forcing the banks to
establish reserve accounts and subtract new reserves from earnings. 26 In January
1990 federal regulators ordered banking agencies to double these Argentine
reserves in their fourth quarter reports.27 Prior to this order eleven major U.S.
banks with significant LDC exposure already had, on the average, about 60
percent reserves against medium- and long-term debt.
28
Lenders have concluded that new lending requires a commitment by the LDCs
toward more market-oriented structural changes. 29 The ineffectiveness and in-
flexibility of conventional restructuring approaches, along with the resulting
needs to set aside loan loss reserves, have given rise to the need for new and
innovative techniques. 30 As a result, the Treasury Department has encouraged
the development of a "menu" of financing options "to help meet the diverse
interests of both debtor nations and the banking community in devising new
financing packages."
3 1
B. THE FINANCING MENU
Citicorp initiated the "menu" concept when it negotiated a "debt-for-equity"
conversion clause into its multiyear restructuring agreement with Mexico. 32 The
menu grew in 1985 when Argentina's restructuring agreement provided for "on-
lending." Argentina and Mexico added "securitization" to the menu in 1987.33 One
of the newest and most innovative items on the menu is the "debt-for-nature swap."
III. The Evolution of the Debt-for-Nature Swap
A. THE INITIATIVE
The World Resources Institute has reported that tropical rain forests the size of
Washington State are being destroyed annually. According to James Gustave
Speth, president of the Institute, this translates into one and a half acres per
26. Farnsworth, supra note 24.
27. Banks Told to Add Reserves, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1990, at D7 (hereinafter Bank Reserves).
28. Forman, British Banks Move on Debt by Third World, Wall St. J., Nov. 10, 1989, at A5, col. 1.
29. Remarks by Rhodes, supra note 24.
30. See Kraus, Loan Renegotiations Put Conservation on the Table, Am. Banker, Sept. 25,
1987, at 17; Note, Debt-Equity Swap Financing of Third World Investments-Will the I.R.S. Hinder
U.S. Swappers?, 8 VA. TAX REV. 143, 147-48; see also C.G. LANGONI, supra note 4, at 56.
31. Statement by David C. Mulford, Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury for International
Affairs Before the Bankers' Association for Foreign Trade 5 (Apr. 27, 1988) [hereinafter Statement
by Mulford]. For a discussion of "menu" options, see Buchheit, Debt Renegotiation, supra note 20,
at 35; Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury James A. Baker Ill at the Joint Meeting of the World
Bank and The International Monetary Fund, at 5-6 (Sept. 30, 1987).
32. Remarks by Rhodes, supra note 24, at 3.
33. Id. On-lending is a process whereby a creditor bank lends new money to an LDC, but the
bank channels the funds to clients of its own choosing within the LDC, usually in local currency. See
id. The securitization plan in Mexico involved a proposal to exchange debt for bonds at an auction.
Id.
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second.34 United States Representative John Porter has further predicted that
these forests will disappear completely in sixty years if the destruction is not
stopped. 35 Congress and the World Bank have become increasingly concerned
about the impact of industrial development projects on the ecologically fragile
environments in LDCs.36 In 1988 the United States Government reported that
more than three billion dollars of loans planned by intergovernment banks to
raise the standard of living in twenty countries were likely to damage natural
resources and the environment. 37 Programs to bolster foreign exchange have
enhanced the problem. 38 As Peter Seligmann, Executive Director of Conserva-
tion International pointed out, "many countries under pressure to pay off their
external debt, seek 'quick fix' solutions that use up their natural resources and
thus the country's economic potential.
' 39
Many of the deeply indebted countries own some of the earth's most important
natural resources. 4 0 LDCs destroy forests in order to clear land for farmland,
pastureland, mining, and timber, hoping to increase production and exports. 4 '
For example, after the simultaneous occurrence of the debt crisis and the collapse
of copper prices, Chili rebuilt its economy with exports of forestry. 4 2 An aide to
Representative Porter has concluded, therefore, that "[t]he only way to deal with
environmental conservation is to deal with international debt. Unless you address
the two issues together, these countries won't even consider environmental pro-
tection.' 43
In 1984, Dr. Thomas E. Lovejoy, Vice President for the World Wildlife
Fund-United States, proposed converting debt into support for conservation
34. Shabecoff, Loss of Tropical Forests Is Found Much Worse Than Was Thought, N.Y. Times,
June 8, 1990, at Al.
35. Kraus, supra note 30, at 17. Representative Porter's sixty-year prediction was based on more
conservative estimates of annual destruction. Id.
36. Id.
37. U.S. Says Third World Loans Pose Environmental Danger, Investor's Daily, Apr. 26, 1988,
at 23. The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) was required by law to distribute a list
of contemplated loans to other donors. Congress asked AID to make early warning reports every six
months. AID was concerned about projects such as the damming of rivers in tropical Third World
countries, the building of roads into undeveloped parts of the world, and the development of rural
areas. As many as 96,000 acres were to be cleared of forest and submerged to accommodate such
projects.
38. Lovejoy, Aid Debtor Nations' Ecology, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1984, at A31. For example, in
Brazil, large-scale changes in land use produce soybeans for export and grow sugar cane to make
alcohol and to reduce imports of oil. Id.
39. Shabecoff, Bolivia to Protect Lands in Swap for Lower Debt, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1987, at C2.
40. Conservation Groups Help to Bail Out the Big Banks, II Bus. & Soc. REV. 34, 34 (1988)
(reprinted from the World Wildlife Fund Letter) [hereinafter Conservation Groups].
41. Id.
42. Christian, Chile Plans to Create Strong Central Bank, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1989, at D14.
43. Kraus, supra note 30, at 17. Peter Seligmann also has asserted that "environmental degra-
dation and weak economies, deforestation and poverty, overpopulation and hunger are now recog-
nized as clearly interrelated." See Shabecoff, supra note 39.
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activities." He believed that "[s]timulating conservation while ameliorating
debt would encourage progress on both fronts." 45 Lovejoy premised the feasi-
bility of the debt-for-nature swaps on the debt-for-equity programs already in
place between many LDCs and their foreign creditors. 46 An analysis of debt-
for-equity swaps therefore helps to explain the evolution of debt-for-nature
swaps.
B. THE DEBT-FOR-EQUITY SWAP
Debt-for-equity swaps are a way not only to reduce the foreign debt burden of
an LDC, but also to revive an LDC's economy in order to enhance its future debt
repayment prospects. The debt-for-equity swap allows an investor to convert an
LDC's foreign debt into an equity investment in a local LDC corporation. The
investor purchases an LDC debt at a discount on the secondary market,47 and
then presents it to the LDC's central bank, which converts the debt at face value
into local currency. The currency can only be used for a long-term equity in-
vestment in the LDC.4 8 The intended effect is for all the parties involved to
benefit from the transaction.
The debt purchaser benefits when it receives more local currency through the
debt-for-equity swap than it would by merely purchasing local currency at the
prevailing market rate. 49 To illustrate, Colombia and Chile's debt securities trade
for about 65 percent of their face value. Venezuela and Mexico receive about 40
percent on the dollar. Brazil receives only 21 percent on the dollar, and Argentina
only 18 percent. Peru receives an unbelievably low 6 percent on the dollar.50 Yet
the LDC's central bank often converts the debt at face value. The investor
thereby increases the local currency available to capitalize a local company.
51
The local company benefits by receiving new capital without having to borrow
locally.52 The debt-for-equity swap can enlarge the scale of domestic stock
markets and expand the capital base of corporations by the issuing of shares.
44. Conservation Groups, supra note 40, at 35-37.
45. Id. Peter W. Stroh, Chairman of Stroh Brewery Co. and Director of Conservation Interna-
tional, added that the creditworthiness of the LDCs could also be improved through use of the swaps.
Kraus, supra note 30, at 17.
46. Snow, Jr., Nature-for-Debt Swaps Make Conservation Hit Parade, World Times Inc., Aug.
1988 (available on Nexis); Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, Sovereign Debt Exchanges, 1988
U. ILL. L. REV. 415, 441 n.103.
47. A creditor bank may also exchange the debt outright.
48. The investor will make secondary market purchases over several weeks in order not to place
upward pressure on offer prices. See Note, supra note 30, at 143; see also Wallenstein & Silkenat,
supra note 21, at 20-21.
49. See Note, supra note 30, at 143; see also Wallenstein & Silkenat, supra note 21, at 13-14.
50. Brooke, supra note 24, at C14.
51. Buchheit, The Capitalization of Sovereign Debt: An Introduction, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 403
[hereinafter Buchheit, Capitalization]; see also T. CONGDON, supra note 3, at 160.
52. Buchheit, Capitalization, supra note 51, at 403.
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Economic efficiency may also improve with the attraction of investment firms
that provide needed expertise.5 3
Corporate growth, in turn, benefits the debtor country by increasing export-
oriented activities and improving the trade balance. 54 Increased investment
should result in higher levels of employment and increased tax and export rev-
enues in the LDC.55 Also, unlike the interest payments that the LDC previously
owed to creditor banks, dividends will only be due to the extent an investment
generates profits. 56 The debtor country thus reduces its external debt and en-
courages foreign investment in a domestic industry.57
A creditor bank, by exchanging its LDC debt outright, can also use the
debt-for-equity swap to its advantage. Most importantly, it can receive cash for
a loan that may never be repaid, or at least not repaid in the near future. It can
also erase a questionable debt from its books. 58 Furthermore, the bank, by
replacing LDC debt with high-risk equity assets, avoids selling the debt on the
secondary market at a substantial discount. This investment offers the bank a
potentially greater rate of return through dividends and capital gains than the
bank would receive from the LDC's interest payments. 59 When LDC debt is
turned into an equity investment, the bank has a chance to recoup the original
loan as well as a potential capital gain at some point in the future, perhaps
receiving more than 100 cents on the dollar.
60
Three factors weigh on the feasibility of debt-for-equity swaps: (1) debtor
country approval must be obtained; (2) debtor and creditor government regula-
tions must be complied with; and (3) any previous syndicated agreement of the
LDC must be complied with. First, most debt exchanges require the prior au-
thorization of the LDC government. 61 LDC governments may hesitate to enter
53. C.G. LANGONI, supra note 4, at 121; Note, supra note 30, at 152. One of the worst
aggravators in a debt crisis is a decline in investment. It indicates a long-term deterioration in growth
prospects, including growth prospects for exports. T. CONGDON, supra note 3, at 156.
54. C.G. LANGONI, supra note 4, at 121. In Mexico, $2.1 billion in debt-for-equity conversions
contributed to a 57 percent increase in foreign investment in 1987. Remarks by William Rhodes,
supra note 24. In the Philippines, foreign investment doubled in 1988 largely due to the conversion
of debt into equity. Sanger, In Manila Coup Effort, Economy Is Big Victim, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20,
1989, at Dl.
55. Wallenstein & Silkenat, supra note 21, at 13.
56. C.G. LANGONI, supra note 4, at 132.
57. Buchheit, Capitalization, supra note 51, at 403; see also Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek,
supra note 46, at 418 n.20.
58. Note, The Federal Reserve Board's "Liberalization" of Restrictions on LDC Debt-Equity
Swaps, LAW & POL'Y INt'L Bus. 163 (1988). The bank can take a bad loan off of its balance sheet.
Even though the bank will suffer a loss, the loss will probably be smaller than expected. See
T. CONGDON, supra note 3, at 160. Some banks may see this as the only opportunity to recover some
of their funds quickly enough to suit bank shareholders. Conservation Groups, supra note 40, at 35.
59. Wallenstein & Silkenat, supra note 21, at 17.
60. Presentation by Richard Huber at the Debt-Equity Swaps Conference, Institute for Intema-
tional Research in New York City (Oct. 19, 1987).
61. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 424.
VOL. 24, NO. 4
DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS 1079
into the transaction because they prefer a flow of "new" money over a conver-
sion into local currency. The fear of the LDC is that the investment made in the
debt-for-equity exchange might have been made anyway had the exchange not
occurred. 62
In addition, LDCs are concerned with potential inflationary effects within their
countries. 63 The government may need to generate new local currency in order
to redeem the foreign debt and allow for the purchase of converted equity.
64
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the LDCs fear foreign control of domestic
enterprises.
65
The above factors have led to LDC regulation of debt-for-equity swaps. In
response to concerns over inflation, some LDC governments have regulated the
amount of debt that may be sold in secondary markets, 66 and some have regu-
lated the timing or manner of disbursing proceeds.67 The LDCs usually put
restrictions on the remittance of dividends and on capital repatriation to the
investors. 68 Unlike interest payments, there is no "agreed" return on the debt-
for-equity conversion. 69 Dividend payments will be subject to the control of the
majority shareholders, not to mention any shifts in the debtor country's economic
trends or policy.70 Furthermore, a debtor country may restrict the percentage of
foreign ownership in a local company or may prohibit investment in certain
industries altogether.
7 1
The creditor country may also regulate debt-for-equity swaps. In the United
States a creditor bank must consider the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation K. 72
Under Regulation K, U.S. banks are only permitted to swap for foreign equity
under specific circumstances. For example, U.S. banks, through bank holding
companies only, may swap sovereign debt for 100 percent equity interests solely
62. In such a case, the country views the exchange as the loss of an opportunity for fresh money.
Buchheit, supra note 51, at 404-05. See also Wallenstein & Silkenat, supra note 21, at 16. Some
domestic investors have invested their money outside the LDCs out of fear of local currency deval-
uation. This has become known as "flight capital." The investors can use this money to invest locally
with the advantage of the secondary market discount. Note, supra note 58, at 165 n. 11.
63. Brazil, for example, suspended debt-for-equity swaps in 1988 on the ground that they were
inflationary. Brooke, Bad Times, Bold Plans for Brazil, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1990, at C4; see also
Segal, The Effect of Debt Equity Conversions on the Economic Restructuring Process, in GUIDE TO
DEBT EQUITY SWAPS, THE ECONOMIST PUBLICATIONS, SPECIAL REPORT No. 1104, at 19 (S. Rubin ed.
1987).
64. Buchheit, Capitalization, supra note 51, at 403; Wallenstein & Silkenat, supra note 21, at
15; Note, supra note 58, at 166.
65. Note, supra note 58, at 166.
66. Wallenstein & Silkenat, supra note 21, at 19.
67. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 427.
68. T. CONGDON, supra note 3, at 160; Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 429.
69. Furthermore, the investments are unsecured. Wallenstein & Silkenat, supra note 21, at 18.
70. Id.
71. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 429. Section 5.11 of the Mexican Public
Sector Debt Agreements provides a good example of the type of regulatory restrictions a foreign
investor may face. For a good discussion of § 5. 11's restrictions, see id.
72. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5 (1988).
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in companies that are currently owned by the LDC government and are to be
privatized. 73 If a U.S. bank wants to swap for an interest in a private company,
Regulation K limits the bank to a swap for a maximum of 40 percent of the equity
in the private company.
7 4
Finally, the parties to a debt-for-equity exchange must adhere to any previous
multibank rescheduling agreements of the LDC. Such agreements often contain
provisions such as "sharing" and "mandatory prepayment" clauses. 75 The
creditor's receipt of property in exchange for the cancellation of a debt may be
treated as a payment that is subject to these clauses. 76
IV. The Feasibility of the Debt-for-Nature Swap
A. THE MECHANISMS
The advantages and disadvantages of the debt-for-equity swap should be
kept in mind when analyzing the feasibility of the debt-for-nature swap. The
debt-for-nature swap functions in basically the same way as the debt-for-equity
swap. A "nature investor," usually a developing country or international non-
governmental organization (NGO), purchases LDC debt at a discount on the
secondary market. The debt is then cancelled in return for environmentally
related action on the part of the debtor nation, as opposed to an equity invest-
ment. 77 As with a debt-for-equity swap, the first step in a debt-for-nature swap
is to obtain approval from the debtor country. This may require negotiations with
the debtor-country government, the LDC's central bank, and a private conser-
vation organization that will manage the program. Negotiations with the debtor
government will cover what exchange rate to apply in converting the dollar
73. Id. § 211.5(f) (2).
74. For more on the extensive restrictions of Regulation K, see Shepard & Clock, Regulatory
Aspects of Developing Nation Debt-Equity Swaps; 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 43, 59-62 (1988); Tigert,
Recent Regulatory Perspectives on Debt-for-Equity Swaps and Securitization of Third World Debt,
1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 481, 481-86; Wallenstein & Silkenat, supra note 21, at 27-29; Note, supra
note 58, at 163-78.
75. An investor planning a commercial debt-for-equity swap must determine the implications of:
(1) debt that is excluded for restructuring; (2) sharing clauses; (30 mandatory prepayment clauses;
(4) pari passu and negative pledge clauses; (5) default clauses; and (6) cross-default clauses. For a
discussion of these clauses, see Walker & Buchheit, Legal Issues in the Restructuring of Commercial
Bank Loans to Sovereign Borrowers, in SOVEREIGN LENDING: MANAGING LEGAL RISK 139-56
(M. Gruson & R. Reisner eds. 1984).
76. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 418-20.
77. S. Hansen, supra note 24, at 2. Four types of debt-for-nature swaps have been proposed:
(a) Conversion of debt into local currency by environmental organisation and investment in
environmental projects;
(b) Donation of debt to an environmental organisation and investment in environmental projects;
(c) Purchase of debt by an environmental organisation and discounted sale to a multinational
corporation (MNC) to support environmentally-sound corporate investments; and
(d) Official debt relief tied to supporting environmental management.
Id.
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debt into local currency and the conditions of payment to be used in exchange
for the debt. 78
Upon completion of these negotiations, the LDC debt instrument must be
purchased on the secondary market. 79 Title to the debt will be transferred in one
of three ways: (1) the NGO may acquire the debt and then donate it to the debtor
country conservation organization; (2) the NGO may donate resources to the
LDC conservation organization to allow it to directly acquire the debt; or (3) the
NGO may directly donate the debt to the LDC conservation organization, which
then acts as agent for the NGO. 80
Upon receipt of the debt, the conservation organization will turn it over to the
LDC's central bank to convert in accordance with the agreement reached be-
tween the organization and the LDC government. The debt may be exchanged
for local currency, local currency bonds, or legislative measures to protect par-
ticular areas. 8 1 The local conservation group will then execute the conservation
program. 82
B. THE COMPLETED SWAPS
The main difference between the debt-for-nature swap and the debt-for-equity
swap is that the conservation organization that acquires the debt does not receive
an equity investment. Rather, when an organization acquires LDC debt, it agrees
to "extinguish the debt in return for the [LDC's] commitment of additional local
resources . . . to conservation programes.- 83 The debt-for-nature transactions to
date are illustrative of the various ways the swap may function.
1. Bolivia: Debt-for-"Payments-in-Kind"
Bolivia participated in the first debt-for-nature swap in 1987.84 Citicorp, act-
ing as agent for Conservation International (CI), purchased $650,000 of Bolivian
debt for $100,000 on the secondary loan market.8 5 CI then turned over the debt
instrument to the Government of Bolivia in exchange for "conservation pay-
ments in kind." 86 The Government of Bolivia agreed to protect the Beni Bio-
78. K. von Moltke, Debt for Nature: An Overview I (undated and unpublished document avail-
able from the World Wildlife Fund).
79. Id. at 1.
80. Id. at 2.
81. Id.
82. Id. The program may contain localized projects or it may involve general conservation
activities that will be undertaken when the local NGO deems them to be appropriate. Conservation
Groups, supra note 40, at 32.
83. Burand, Doing it Naturally: The Greening of International Finance, INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
Sept. 1989, at 38.
84. S. Hansen, supra note 24, at 3.
85. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 441; see also Beautiful Barter in Bolivia,
ECONOMIST, July 18, 1987, at 26 [hereinafter Beautiful Barter].
86. S. Hansen, supra note 24, at 3.
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sphere Reserve, which was being cut down for cattle ranching and lumbering
operations, and to permanently set aside 3.7 million acres next to the reserve.87
All of the areas were granted congressional law status, the highest legal protec-
tion status in Bolivia. 88 The government put together a public-private partnership
to develop a program that combined ecosystem conservation and regional de-
velopment planning in the tropical forest land.89
The Bolivian Government also agreed to establish an operating fund of local
currency equalling $250,000 to pay for the administration and protection of the
reserve. 90 Management of the areas was divided between the government and a
Bolivian nongovernmental organization that would have access to the local cur-




In 1987 Fundacion Natura (FN), Ecuador's leading private conservation
group, reached an agreement with the government's monetary board that enabled
the foundation to exchange up to $10 million in debt for local currency bonds. 9 3
The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and FN accomplished the first step in March
1988 when they completed a debt-for-nature transaction for the acquisition of
Ecuadoran Central Bank debt with a face value of $1 million. 94
The swap agreement differed from Bolivia's agreement in that it was struc-
tured as a debt-for-debt exchange, rather than debt for "payments in kind. ' 95
WWF acquired the debt for thirty-five cents on the dollar and then, in compli-
ance with Ecuador's Central Bank requirements,96 assigned the debt to FN,
87. The Bolivian Case (undated and unpublished document available from the World Wildlife
Fund); Shabecoff, supra note 39, at C2. Bolivia's 334,200-acre Beni Biosphere Reserve was created
by administrative decree in 1982 as a model for the protection of local ethnic groups as well as for
the area's plants, animals, and water. It is a habitat for 500 species of birds, supports 13 endangered
species of plants and animals, and has more species of trees than all of North America. Id.
88. Bolivia Sets Precedent with First Ever "Debt for Nature" Swap (Conservation International
News Release, July 13, 1987).
89. S. Hansen, supra note 24, at 3.
90. The Bolivian Case, supra note 87; Burand, supra note 83, at 38-39; S. Hansen, supra note
24, at 3; see also Shabecoff, supra note 39, at C2.
91. Shabecoff, supra note 39, at C2.
92. Id.
93. The Ecuadoran Case (undated and unpublished document available from the World Wildlife
Fund).
94. World Wildlife Fund and Ecuador Sign Largest Debt-for-Nature Swap (World Wildlife Fund
News Release, Dec. 14, 1987) [hereinafter News Release]; Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra
note 46, at 443.
95. The Ecuadoran Case, supra note 93; Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at
443.
96. The debt exchange was in accord with § 5.11 of Ecuador's Consolidation Agreement dated
Aug. 15, 1986. Ecuador's Consolidation Agreement was a syndicated debt agreement that contem-
plated debt-for-debt exchanges. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 443.
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subject to WWF participation.97 In exchange for the debt, the government issued
bonds at 100 percent of the face value of the note and then converted them into
sucres at the official exchange rate. The bonds would mature over nine years and
interest would be linked to market rates. 98
The agreement provided for the interest on the bonds to be used to finance
FN's activities in connection with protecting and managing natural areas and
their buffer zones. 99 The interest for the first year was earmarked for specific
areas throughout Ecuador, and the interest in later years was earmarked for
projects to be selected by FN in consultation with WWF. ,oo When the bonds
mature in 1996, the principal will be used to establish an endowment fund for
FN. 101
The second installment of the $10 million program came in 1989 when WWF
and the Nature Conservancy (NC) announced that they would buy $9 million of
Ecuadoran debt from American Express and J.P. Morgan and Co. at twelve cents
on the dollar. The debt will be converted dollar-for-dollar by the central bank into
local currency bonds. 
10 2
3. Costa Rica: Government-to-Government Exchange
Costa Rica's first debt-for-nature exchange arose from a request by the Minister
of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines of Costa Rica. 103 Pursuant to the request,
the Central Bank of Costa Rica approved the establishment of a Natural Resources
Conservation Fund to be financed through a debt exchange program. 104 The agree-
ment, dated October 27, 1987, was between the Central Bank of Costa Rica, the
Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines, the National Parks Foundation
(a leading nongovernmental conservation organization in Costa Rica), and Banco
Cooperativo Costarricense (a commercial bank). 10 5
Under the agreement, which was similar to the Ecuadoran agreement, the
government authorized the National Parks Foundation to exchange up to $5.4
million aggregate principal amount of Costa Rica's external debt with any in-
terested nongovernmental organization. 10 6 The debt would be exchanged for
local currency bonds issued at 75 percent of face value. (Compare this to Ec-
97. Id. Citicorp actually purchased the Ecuadoran debt, on behalf of WWF-US, from Bankers
Trust Company. Id.
98. The Ecuadoran Case, supra note 93; S. Hansen, supra note 24, at 3.
99. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 443.
100. News Release, supra note 94; Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 443.
101. The Ecuadoran Case, supra note 93.
102. Swimmer, Environmentalists Sign Record Debt Plan to Save Rain Forests, The Reuter
Library Report, Apr. 5, 1989 (available on Nexis).
103. Chamberlin, Gruson, and Weltchek, supra note 46, at 445 n. l15.
104. Junta Directiva No. 4234-87, art. 7 (Aug. 12, 1987); Acuerdo No. 4235-87, art. 16
(Aug. 19, 1987), cited in Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 445 n. 115.
105. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 445 n. 115.
106. World Wildlife Fund Term Sheet (undated and unpublished document available from the
World Wildlife Fund).
WINTER 1990
1084 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
uador's bonds, which were issued at 100 percent face value.) The maturity date
for the bonds was comparable to the maturity date of the swapped debt. '
0 7
Proceeds would go to various entitled Costa Rican conservation groups. to8 The
$5.4 million ceiling was met in 1988 and increased to $50 million.
1 09
In 1989 NC bought $5.6 million in Costa Rican debt for $784,000 from
American Express Bank. '1 0 NC and a private environmental group in Costa Rica
then renegotiated the debt with the government. Under the new terms the gov-
ernment will owe $1.7 million plus interest, which will be used to issue Costa
Rican currency bonds to finance conservation projects. I t
Costa Rica completed two more debt-for-nature swaps in 1989. In January the
Dutch Government purchased $33 million of Costa Rican debt for $5 million in
what was the first government-to-government exchange without NGO involve-
ment. The two governments established a Costa Rican-Dutch nature trust fund.
Decisions on spending will be made by a joint commission composed of the
Costa Rican Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines, the Costa Rican
Ministry of Planning, and the Dutch Ambassador to Costa Rica. In April the
Swedish Government purchased $25 million of Costa Rican debt for $3.5 million
and donated it to the Fundacion de Parques Nacionales." 
2
4. The Philippines: Debt-for-Cash
The first debt-for-nature agreement outside of Latin America was signed in the
Philippines in June 1988.1 13 WWF agreed to acquire up to $2 million in Phil-
ippine debt. 114 The first installment was made in 1989 when WWF acquired debt
worth $390,000 at fifty-one cents on the dollar. The central bank credited the full
amount of the debt to a local currency account to be made available to the
Haribon Foundation and the Department of Environment and Natural Re-
sources. 1 5 There were two restrictions. The money could not be used to pay
non-Philippine consultants and could only be used for national projects. 116 The
107. Chamberlin, Gruson & WeItchek, supra note 46, at 445 n. 115; see also The Costa Rican
Case (undated and unpublished document available from the World Wildlife Fund).
108. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 445 n. 115.
109. Costa Rican National Parks to Benefit from Debt Swap, The Reuter Library Report, Jan. 11,
1989 (available on Nexis).
110. Clements, Finance: Banks Expected to Take More 3rd World Debt Losses in 1989, Inter Press
Service, Dec. 29, 1988 (available on Nexis).
11l. Stammer, Costa Rica will Preserve Forests in Exchange for Reduction of Debt, L.A. Times,
Jan. 13, 1989, at 32, col. 1.
112. J. Gibson & R. Curtis, A Debt-for-Nature Blueprint 123-24 (undated and unpublished draft
manuscript available from The Nature Conservancy).
113. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 444.
114. The Philippine Case (undated and unpublished document available from the World Wildlife
Fund).
115. Id.; see also World Wildlife Fund Term Sheet, supra note 106.
116. The Philippine Case, supra note 114.
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Philippine agreement was structured similarly to the Ecuador exchange agree-
ment, except that the exchange was for cash rather than local currency bonds. '
1 7
WWF has proposed a new $18 million program with the Philippines. "18
5. Madagascar: Government Funding
In 1989 the Agency for International Development (AID), WWF, and the
country of Madagascar participated in the first debt-for-nature swap to be fi-
nanced largely by governmental rather than international agencies. AID granted
one million dollars to WWF to facilitate a debt-for-nature swap aimed at the
preservation of tropical forests in Madagascar. 19 AID purchased $2.1 million of
Madagascar's debt for $950,000 and then granted the debt to WWF. 120 The swap
was only the first step in an agreement allowing up to $3 million.' 2 1
6. Other Countries
In August 1989 WWF agreed to purchase $2.27 million of Zambia's debt at
twenty cents on the dollar in a single conversion deal. ' 22 Zambia agreed to pay
WWF the full $2.27 million in local currency to use for conservation.' 23 In 1989
the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany officially wrote off approx-
imately $405 million of Kenya's debts in return for Kenya's commitment to
protect the environment. 124 Other countries that are currently considering debt-
for-nature swaps include Peru, Brazil, Jamaica, Mexico, Haiti, Tanzania, Po-
land, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the Dominican Republic. 12
5
C. DEBT-FOR-NATURE VERSUS DEBT-FOR-EQuITY
Like the debt-for-equity swap, the debt-for-nature swap benefits all of the
parties involved. As opposed to the foreign investor receiving the benefit of the
discounted secondary market rate, promoters of conservation can establish or
117. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 445 n. 114.
118. Philippines Pioneers Debt-for-Nature Swaps in Asia, The Reuter Business Report, Aug. 30,
1989 (available on Nexis).
119. "Debt-for-Nature" Swap, Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 1989, at A21.
120. Id.; see also World Wildlife Fund Term Sheet, supra note 106.
121. "Debt-for-Nature" Swap, supra note 119, at A21; see also World Wildlife Fund Term
Sheet, supra note 106. For an additional agreement, see Agreement to Preserve Environment Pro-
vides Help for Madagascar, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1990, at B8 (first debt-for-nature swap that
cancels both trade debt and bank debt).
122. World Wildlife Fund Term Sheet, supra note 106.
123. Id.
124. Jaura, Finance: West Germany in "Debt-for-Nature" Deal with Kenya, Inter Press Service,
Oct. 4, 1989 (available on Nexis).
125. Regin, Debt-for-Nature Swaps Seen Growing in Next Few Years, Reuters, Sept. 19, 1989
(available on Nexis); Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 445; Mini-Debt-for-Nature
Swap to Break the Ice in Dominican Republic, Institutional Investor, Inc.; Bank Letter, Dec. 11, 1989
(available on Nexis).
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finance conservation projects at a favorable cost. 126 The debt-for-nature swaps
are a "tool for leveraging conservation dollars."'' 27 For example, the initial
Ecuador exchange was estimated to produce three dollars plus future interest
income for every dollar WWF bought.
1 28
A commercial bank also benefits in a variety of ways, depending on whether
it sells or donates the LDC debt. If the bank sells the debt on the secondary market,
it will receive some payment for a debt that might never have been repaid and will
receive a bad debt deduction for the remainder, thereby removing a questionable
debt from its books. 129 On the other hand, if the bank chooses to donate the debt,
it can benefit from favorable publicity and favorable tax treatment,1 30 both of
which serve to explain a debt write-off to the bank's shareholders.' 3'
Finally, the LDCs reduce their debt burdens while supporting public interest
programs. 132 This result is beneficial because debt-for-nature programs usually
cover activities that are already approved by the LDC governments, but for
which funds are inadequate or unavailable. The debt-for-nature can be seen as "a
means of achieving debtor country goals in an area where funds have been
chronically short because of the apparently more pressing needs of short-term
economic development."' 
33
A party debating a debt-for-nature transaction should consider many of the
same factors it would consider for a debt-for-equity swap: (1) approval from the
debtor country government; (2) regulations of that government; (3) regulations of
the creditor government; and (4) restrictions imposed by previous rescheduling
agreements. The debt-for-nature swap has some distinct advantages over the
debt-for-equity swap regarding these types of restrictions.
First, with respect to debtor country approval, debt-for-nature shares debt-for-
equity's problem of LDC preference for "new money."' 34 The debt-for-nature
swap has the advantage, however, that all money stays in the debtor country.
This alleviates the fear that the investor will take profits out of the country for
reinvestment elsewhere, a fear commonly associated with the debt-for-equity
swap.
126. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 441, 446; Conservation Groups, supra
note 40, at 34.
127. World Wildlife Fund and Ecuador Sign Largest Debt-for-Nature Swap (World Wildlife Fund
News Release, Dec. 12, 1987).
128. Id.
129. K. von Moltke, supra note 78, at 3.
130. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 441. See Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2
C.B. 205.
131. Snow, Jr., supra note 46.
132. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 441.
133. K. von Moltke, supra note 78, at 4.
134. Glen, supra note 25, at II.
135. See BT Structures Asia Debt-for-Nature Swap, Institutional Investor, Inc.; Bank Letter,
Dec. 19, 1988 (available on Nexis).
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LDCs may also be concerned with the debt-for-nature swap's potential effect
on inflation, 1 36 but the parties to a debt-for-nature swap can structure their
agreement to deal with this problem. Most of the completed debt-for-nature
transactions have involved a conversion into some kind of interest-bearing ac-
count or bonds, rather than cash, thus preventing a distortion of money sup-
ply. 137 The potential for inflation can also be reduced by structuring the agree-
ment so that payments are stretched over many years. The deal could be arranged
so that the debtor country would pay slightly less to preservation projects than it
is currently paying in interest. 138
Like debt-for-equity, a government may be hesitant to enter into a debt-for-
nature swap due to fear of foreign control. Some debtor governments have the
mistaken impression that part of their country will be sold. As one Third World
official put it, "[H]ow would you like it if the Japanese used your trade deficit
to buy the Grand Canyon?"'' 39 In actuality, one of the main strengths of the
debt-for-nature swap is that no ownership of equity or other property is trans-
ferred to a foreign investor. 40 As previously mentioned, the programs usually
cover activities already approved by the debtor government, and all money stays
in the debtor country. No swaps are transacted over the objection of the national
government, and all of the central banks have to agree to the transaction. 1
41
Nonetheless, not all of an LDC's public sector debt may qualify for use in the
country's debt exchange program because of debtor and creditor country regu-
lations and because of restrictions imposed by the LDC's previous syndicated
agreements. 142 Debt-for-nature swaps have proven to be a flexible method to
escape these potential roadblocks when debt-for-equity swaps cannot. While
many debtor country regulations or syndication agreements limit debt exchange
arrangements, they do not contemplate debt-for-nature exchanges. As opposed to
commercial debt-for-equity swaps, most noncommercial exchanges (debt-for-
nature) have been negotiated without incorporating the formal requirements and
restrictions of the commercial debt-for-equity programs. 143 This more flexible
approach is partly due to the fact that the formal programs were designed to
136. Conservation Groups, supra note 40, at 35-36; see also Burand, supra note 41, at 83. The
investor, as well as the debtor country, needs to examine the potential for inflationary effects.
137. A Review of Foreign Assistance Related: Hearing on Environmental Considerations in
Shaping Economic Development Policy in Third World Before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (Statement of Tom Lovejoy, assistant secretary for external
affairs, Smithsonian Institution) [hereinafter Hearing on Environmental Considerations].
138. Tye, Winning One for the Forest; Alliance of Bankers, Environmentalists Creates Debt-for-
Nature Swaps, The Boston Globe, Apr. 10, 1989, at 13.
139. Petesch & Annis, "Debt-for-Development" Plan Is No Gift for Third World, L.A. Times,
Dec. 9, 1987, at 7, col. 1.
140. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 442.
141. Hearing on Environmental Considerations, supra note 137.
142. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 435.
143. Id. at 446-47.
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promote private investment and exports, and therefore do not cover charitable
transactions. 144 For example, section 5.11 of the Mexican Public Sector Debt Agree-
ments only regulates foreign investment, and exchanges of equity. 145 Likewise, Reg-
ulation K in the United States governs foreign equity investments. 146 Bolivia's swap
is a good example of a debt-for-nature transaction that occurred without any formal
program authorizing debt-for-equity swaps or other debt exchanges. 1
47
In other cases, debt-for-nature swaps have been structured so as to avoid any
formal syndication restrictions that might have applied to the swaps. For exam-
ple, Ecuador's Consolidation Agreement requires that qualified investments re-
ceived in exchange for debt may not be paid earlier than the maturity date of the
original debt. 148 As a result, Ecuador's debt-for-nature swap was structured as a
debt-for-debt exchange. Bonds were issued that will not mature until the original
debt maturity date. 149 When new debt, rather than equity, is received in cancel-
lation of old debt, parties are generally free to negotiate terms of the new debt. 15
0
The Ecuador exchange is particularly significant because the debt-for-debt/debt-
for-nature exchange proceeded at a time when Ecuador's exchange program was
otherwise inactive. 15' Thus, the debt-for-nature transaction is advantageous be-
cause it may allow "individual commercial banks or other investors to negotiate
with debtor countries for the release of debt from the restrictions of complex
syndicated rescheduling agreements."'
152
V. United States Support of Debt-for-Nature Swaps
Section 537(c) of the 1988 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill' 5 3 directed
the Treasury to submit a debt-for-nature report to analyze:
(1) the operation of mechanisms to purchase, at market discounts, developing
country debt in exchange for domestic currency investments in conserva-
tion at the full par value of the purchased debt;
(2) the operation of mechanisms to reschedule substantial amounts of developing
country debt to longer term maturities with reduced interest rates in exchange
for borrower country conservation investment in local currencies; and
(3) the establishment of programs by the World Bank and IMF to encourage
the private purchase of developing country debt at discount rates in ex-
144. Id. at 447.
145. Mexican Public Sector Debt Agreements § 5.11, reprinted in Chamberlin, Gruson &
WeItchek, supra note 46, at 477-79.
146. 12C.F.R. § 211.5
147. Chamberlin, Gruson & WeItchek, supra note 46, at 442.
148. Id. at 444.
149. Id. at 443.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 444.
152. Id.
153. H.R.J. Res. 395, 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-162 (1987).
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change for local currency conservation investments at the full par value of
such debt. 154
The resulting Treasury report 55 advocated debt-for-nature swaps, but it lim-
ited the Treasury's own role in such swaps to helping reduce tax and regulatory
obstacles.' 56 The report also noted that the role of multilateral development
banks (MDBs), such as the World Bank, would also be limited because MDB
loans are not saleable in the secondary markets, cannot be converted to grants for
environmental purposes, and are not reschedulable. 157 The report adopted sev-
eral proposals for initiatives the World Bank could take in order to help facilitate
debt-for-nature swaps.' 58 Since this report, the United States has facilitated
debt-for-nature swaps both through tax benefits and through the International
Development and Finance Act of 1989.
A. UNITED STATES TAX INCENTIVES: REVENUE RULING 87-124
The Treasury Department, in Revenue Ruling 87-124, provided an economic
incentive for creditor banks to donate part of their LDC debt directly to conser-
vation organizations for the organizations' use in debt-for-nature swaps. 159 Prior
to the ruling a creditor was better off if it sold the LDC debt on the secondary
market and then donated the proceeds. The creditor received a business loss
deduction on the sale' 6 and a charitable contribution deduction for the dona-
tion. 161 The sum of the two deductions equalled the donor's full tax basis in the
debt. Under Treasury Regulation 1. 170A- I (c), however, a creditor that donated
LDC debt directly to a conservation organization only received a charitable de-
duction to the extent of the fair market value of the debt at the time of the con-
tribution.' 62 If the debt had a secondary market value below the donor's cost basis,
which was always the case, the donor recovered only part of its basis. As a result,
banks preferred to sell the debt, although by doing so they diminished the potential
funds available for conservation. If a conservation organization received proceeds
from a secondary market sale, it received merely a percentage of the original debt's
value, whereas if the organization received the debt instrument itself for use in
a swap, the debt would be converted at, or close to, face value.
154. Id.
155. U.S. Treasury Dep't. Report to Congress on Debt-for-Nature Swaps 1 (April 1988).
156. Id. at 2, 5.
157. Id. at 5. The World Bank maintains that it cannot sell or negotiate debt-for-nature swaps with
outstanding public debt because of prohibitions in its charter. Representative Porter believes the bank
does have some flexibility to refinance or restructure debt, but chooses not to as a matter of policy.
Cody, Debt-for-Nature Swaps in Developing Countries: An Overview of Recent Conservation Efforts,
Cong. Research Serv. 16 (Sept. 26, 1988).
158. J. Gibson & R. Curtis, supra note 112, at 68-69.
159. Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205.
160. See I.R.C. § 165(a) (1989).
161. See I.R.C. § 170 (1989) for charitable donation rules.
162. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-I(c) (1989).
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The Internal Revenue Service issued Revenue Ruling 78-124 in order to put
a donation of LDC debt on a par with a sale-donation of the debt. 163 According
to the ruling, if a commercial bank exchanges the dollar denominated debt of an
LDC central bank for local currency, and the central bank credits the local
currency to the account of a U.S. charitable organization' 64 for charitable use in
the foreign country, the bank will: (1) recognize a loss equal to the difference
between its cost basis in the debt and the fair market value of the currency
received; and (2) receive a charitable deduction equal to the fair market value of
the local currency. 165 The deduction for the loss and the charitable contribution
will now add up to the bank's full tax basis.
In spite of this added incentive, banks have been reluctant to take advantage
of Revenue Ruling 78-124 because of the potential issues it raises.' 66 First, the
ruling only refers to an exchange for debt obligations of the LDC's central bank,
thus leaving open the question of whether an exchange for other public or private
sector debt will qualify. In addition, the ruling assumes a conversion of debt into
local currency, although many of the debt-for-nature swap agreements require a
conversion into local currency bonds. Finally, the ruling is unclear as to what
happens if the local currency is credited to a foreign organization rather than a
U.S. charitable organization.
In a letter dated March 29, 1988, Senate Finance Committee member, John H.
Chafee, asked the Treasury to clarify the scope of the ruling. 167 According to C. Eu-
gene Steurle, treasury deputy assistant secretary for tax analysis, the ruling does
encompass debt obligations of an entity other than the central bank of the LDC and
therefore includes public and private sector debt. 168 Steurle also stated that the debt
can be exchanged for local currency bonds as well as local currency. 1
69
Steurle provided a less definitive answer to the question whether currency that
is credited to a foreign, rather than a U.S., organization will result in a deduction
to the donor bank. Revenue Ruling 87-124 allows a charitable contribution
deduction if the bank's donation meets the requirements of the Internal Revenue
Code (IRC) regarding charitable contributions. ' 70 Section 170(c), the governing
section of the IRC, says that the donor will only receive a charitable deduction
for contributions made "to or for the use of" organizations "created or orga-
nized in the United States or in any possession thereof."' 171 Even when a con-
tribution is made directly to a U.S. charitable organization, Revenue Ruling
163. See Cody, supra note 157, at 27.
164. The donation must be for a charitable organization described in I.R.C. § 170(c) (2) (1989).
165. Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205.
166. J. Gibson & R. Curtis, supra note 112, at 53.
167. See Treasury Takes Favorable Position on Debt-for-Nature Swaps, Tax Notes, Apr. 12,
1988, at 402 [hereinafter Chafee Letter].
168. Id.; see also Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 46, at 464.
169. Chafee Letter, supra note 167, at 402.
170. Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205.
171. I.R.C. § 170(c) (1989).
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63-252 holds that a donor will not receive a deduction if the donation is ear-
marked for use by a foreign charity.' 
72
The mere fact that a foreign charity ends up with the funds is not conclusive,
however. Under certain circumstances a donee organization may funnel the
donated funds to a foreign charity without jeopardizing the donor bank's tax
deduction. In Revenue Ruling 66-79, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) held
that if a donor makes contributions to a domestic charity described in section
170(c)(2) of the IRC17 3 for a foreign charitable organization's use in a specific
project, the donor may take a deduction if the domestic charity has reviewed and
approved the project as being in furtherance of its own exempt purposes and has
control and discretion over the use of the contributions. 174 In Revenue Ruling
75-65, the IRS allowed a deduction for contributions made to a U.S. charity that
made grants to foreign charities because the U.S. charity maintained control over
the donated funds by ensuring that they were spent pursuant to a written agree-
ment. 175 Based on these rulings, Steurle concluded:
A U.S. charity may work in cooperation with an entity organized under the laws of the
foreign country and may solicit contributions for grants to the foreign entity without
jeopardizing the charitable deduction, provided that the U.S. charity has such control
and discretion regarding contributions as to ensure that the contributions will be used
to carry out the U.S. charity's charitable functions and purposes. 176
These rulings do not necessarily help the debt-for-nature donor. Most likely, a
U.S. charity will have difficulty meeting a control test because most debt-for-
nature swaps are structured so as to give control to an LDC entity in order to
avoid imposing upon the LDC government's sovereignty. The donated funds are
usually credited to a foreign organization's account. 177 In response to this prob-
lem, Steurle cited Brinley v. Commissioner 78 for the proposition that it may be
possible for a donor to credit funds directly to the account of a foreign charity if
use of such funds is limited to a specific charitable purpose selected by the U.S.
charity.179 In Brinley, parents, at the request of a church, sent money directly to
a travel agent in order to support their son's unsalaried mission on behalf of the
church. The parents claimed a charitable deduction on the ground that although
the money was sent to the travel agent, it was for the "primary benefit" of the
church. The Brinley court concluded that the deductibility of any expenditure "is
essentially a question of fact to be determined from all the facts and circum-
stances on a case-by-case basis."' 180 A charitable donation, to be deductible
172. Rev. Rul. 63-252, 1963-2 C.B. 101.
173. For a list of qualifying organizations, see I.R.C. § 170(c) (2) (1989).
174. Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48.
175. Rev. Rul. 75-65, 1975-1 C.B. 79.
176. Chafee Letter, supra note 167, at 402.
177. See generally J. Gibson & R. Curtis, supra note 112, at 47.
178. 782 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1986).
179. Chafee Letter, supra note 167, at 402.
180. Brinley, 782 F.2d, at 1336.
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under section 170 of the IRC, must meet either the "control" test or the "pri-
mary beneficiary" test, or a combination of both. 8 ' The exercise of full control
over donated funds is not a prerequisite for deductibility. 182 Based on the Brinley
court's "facts and circumstances" conclusion, Steurle suggested that potential
debt donors use the private letter ruling procedure for guidance. '
83
B. CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT OF DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS: THE
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCE Acr OF 1989
In December 1989 Congress enacted legislation in reaction to the sentiment
among some congressional members that the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (the World Bank) and regional MDBs should be held
accountable for the quality of the environment that has resulted from their past
decisions. 184 Representative John Porter told the House Banking Subcommittee
on International Development Institutions that MDBs have funded "huge dams,
migration, and road building projects into tropical forests."1 85 Thus, Congress
enacted The International Development and Finance Act of 1989 (the Act) to
"encourage the multilateral development banks to engage in environmentally
sustainable lending practices." 1
86
The Act encourages MDB involvement in debt-for-nature swaps. Section 512
of the Act, "Multilateral Development Banks and Debt-for-Nature Ex-
changes,"1 87 instructs the U.S. executive directors of the MDBs to "negotiate
for the creation in each respective multilateral development bank ... of a
department that will ... actively promote, coordinate and facilitate debt-for-
nature exchanges and the restoration, protection, and sustainable use of tropical
forests, renewable natural resources, endangered ecosystems and species in
debtor countries."' 188 In addition, the directors must:
encourage the banks to assist such countries in reducing and restructuring private debt
through the use of a portion of a project or policy based environmental loan in ways
which will enable such countries to buy back private debt at a rate of discount available
for such debt, at auction in the secondary market or through negotiations with creditors
holding such debt.' 89
181. The Brinley court cited Orr v. United States, 343 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1965), for the
proposition that the charitable work must be the cause of the payment. Brinley, 782 F.2d at 1331.
182. Brinley, 782 F.2d at 1331.
183. Chafee Letter, supra note 167, at 402.
184. International Finance, World Bank Should Be Held Accountable for Environmental Effects,
Porter Says, B.N.A. Daily Report for Executives, May 25, 1988 (available on Nexis).
185. Id.
186. International Development and Finance Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-240, 103 Stat. 2492
(1989).
187. Section 512 of the Act amends the International Financial Institutions Act, 22 U.S.C. 262c
et seq. (1988).
188. Pub. L. No. 101-240, § 512, 103 Stat. 2492, 2508 (1989).
189. Id.
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The directors must also ensure that "staff of each bank facilitate debtor coun-
tries' collaboration with local and international nongovernmental or private or-
ganizations in implementing debt-for-nature exchanges."
1 90
Title VII, section 711, Chapter 7 of the Act, 19 ' "Debt-for-Nature Ex-
changes," authorizes spending by AID for use in debt-for-nature swaps. 192 AID
may grant funds for the purchase of secondary market debt of an "eligible
country" to be used in debt-for-nature exchanges. 193 Section 711 of the Act also
contains an important provision that allows an AID grantee to retain the "interest
earned on the proceeds of any resulting debt-for-nature exchange."',
94 Previ-
ously, U.S. law required that U.S. grant recipients forfeit interest back to the
grantor. 195 This revision is an important tool to hedge against inflation because
the grantee will not be forced to spend money for long-term projects over a short
period of time. 196 The interest from bonds will be spent over a number of years
and will ensure a steady source of conservation dollars.
Section 711 of the Act lists "eligible projects" for which the AID funds may
be used. 197 It also states that the administrator of AID "shall encourage as many
eligible countries as possible to propose such exchanges with the purpose of
demonstrating to a large number of governments the feasibility and benefits of
sustainable development."' 98 Section 711 further requires an LDC to meet cer-
tain conditions before it will be eligible to receive funds from AID. The LDC
must fully commit itself to the "long-term viability of the program or project"
and must prepare a long-term plan that "adequately provides for the long-term
viability of the program." 1 99 The LDC must also have a governmental agency or
190. Id.
191. Title VII, § 711, of the Act amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
192. Pub. L. No. 101-240, § 711, 103 Stat. 2492, 2521 (1989).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2521-22.
195. Debt-for-Nature Bill Moving to Senate Floor, Institutional Investor, Inc.; Bank Letter,
June 19, 1989, at 4.
196. Id.
197. Pub. L. No. 101-240, § 711, 103 Stat. 2492, 2522 (1989). Eligible projects include:
(1) restoration, protection, or sustainable use of the world's oceans and atmosphere;
(2) restoration, protection, or sustainable use of diverse animal and plant species;
(3) establishment, restoration, protection, and maintenance of parks and reserves;
(4) development and implementation of sound systems of natural resource management;
(5) development and support of local conservation programs;
(6) training programs to strengthen conservation institutions and increase scientific, techni-
cal, and managerial capabilities of individuals and organizations involved in conservation
efforts;
(7) efforts to generate knowledge, increase understanding, and enhance public commitment
to conservation;
(8) design and implementation of sound programs of land and ecosystem management; and
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local NGO "with the capability, commitment, and record of environmental
concern to oversee the long-term viability of the program."
200
Section 711 of the Act also addresses issues of sovereignty, by prohibiting the
U.S. Government from accepting title or interest in any land in a foreign country
as a condition to the debt exchange. 20 1 Finally, section 722 of the Act states that
the Secretary of State should initiate:
negotiations among member countries on a coordinated approach to global warming,
tropical deforestation, sustainable development, and biological diversity through bilat-
eral assistance programs that would include ... expanded use of forgiveness of foreign
assistance debt in exchange for policy changes or programs that address problems
associated with global warming, tropical deforestation, sustainable development, and
biological diversity. 20
2
VI. The Impact of Debt-for-Nature Swaps
Perhaps the biggest question with regard to debt-for-nature swaps is their ability
to make a true impact upon the international market. Total worldwide debt is estimated
at $1.3 trillion, double the total in 1982.203 At the end of 1986, fifteen key debtor
countries (accounting for about one half of all LDC external debt) owed $465 billion
to foreign lenders. 204 The U.S. exposure alone was $86.2 billion.20 5
In terms of short-term impact, debt-for-nature swaps do not appear to make a
dent in this debt. So far, they have only eliminated about $500,000,000 of LDC
debt. 20 6 By comparison, the volume of debt-for-equity swaps surpassed $12
billion between 1982 and 1987.207
While the debt-for-nature swap may not have the short-term impact of a
debt-for-equity exchange, it is still a crucial long-term weapon against the in-
crease in both Third World debt and the destruction of the environment. The
preservation of tropical forests, the reduction in the debt burden, and the mini-
mization of financial losses of lenders is linked. 20 8 Even if the debt-for-nature
swap does not significantly reduce the principal amount of an LDC's debt, it can
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2524.
203. Farnsworth, U.S. Falls Short on Its Debt Plan for Third World, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1990,
at 27.
204. Glen, supra note 25, at 11.
205. Id. Brazil owes $19.1 billion dollars to U.S. banks, Mexico owes $15.7 billion, Venezuela
owes $6.9 billion, and Argentina owes $6.2 billion. Bank Reserves, supra note 28, at D7.
206. In 1989, the World Resources Institute reported a figure of $100,000,000. The report was
published before the $405,000,000 Kenyan swap, however. See J. Gibson & R. Curtis, supra note
112, at 131 n.474 (citing World Resources Institute, National Endowments: Financing Resource
Conservation for Development 16-17 (Sept. 1989)).
207. See Glen, supra note 25, at 11. Mexico's $2.1 billion debt-for-equity conversion in 1987
contributed to a 57 percent increase in foreign investment in 1987. Chile has retired about 16 percent
of its external debt through debt-for-equity conversions. Remarks by Rhodes, supra note 24, at 4-5.
208. Burand, supra note 41, at 83.
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improve the LDC's ability to make annual interest payments. Many LDCs only
make partial interest payments on their loans. The creditor then adds the balance
to the principal amount of the debt. Konrad von Moltke of WWF suggests that
a debt-for-nature swap's impact should be measured "against the effective an-
nual rise in principal attributable to a country's inability to service its debt. A
country's debt situation can be considered stabilized when interest payments are
not causing an increase in indebtedness." ' 20 9 Furthermore, if one looks at the
debt-for-nature swap from the point of view of its impact on conservation, its
effect is enormous. The interest alone from the Costa Rica swap is several times
more than the annual budget of Costa Rica's national park system.
2 10
The most important impact of the debt-for-nature swap is its effect on the
long-term economic health of an LDC. LDCs need hard currency to deal with the
short-term problem of debt repayment. 2 1 In their rush to obtain this hard cur-
rency, LDCs "liquidate" to dig out of the hole. The resources that can be tapped
most quickly are a country's "free" natural resources, so an LDC cuts down
trees to make partial payments on the loan but is unable to get completely out of
the hole. In the process, the LDC eliminates its resource base needed to develop
its economy for the future.21 2 LDCs in effect "borrow from their forests, soils,
fish, and wildlife to stay solvent. But this form of debt servicing is unsustainable
... ,23 because "[t]he decapitalization of nature surpasses by far any present
effort invested in conservation.
' 21 4
According to Deborah Burand, financing coordinator for CI, "many more
Latin American governments are recognizing that debt conversion for nonprofit
purposes are of equal importance to debt-equity conversions. There is a growing
recognition by these governments that these kinds of investments are supportive
of the economic development objectives that they already have. ' 21 5 Conserva-
tion serves as an investment just like the debt-for-equity swap.
A conservation investment can be in either known or unknown resources. For
example, forests have become the mainstay of many national economies. Ac-
cording to the World Bank, some 200 million people currently make their living
directly from tropical forests, but fewer than ten of thirty-three countries that are
now net exporters of tropical forests products will still be producing within a
209. K. von Moltke, supra note 78, at 4.
210. Umana, Costa Rica's Debt-for-Nature Swaps Come of Age, Wall St. J., May 26, 1989, at
A 1l. Vera Varela, administrative director of the National Parks Foundation in Costa Rica, said Costa
Rica is "achieving things in five years that [it] thought would take 20." Culotta, Debt-for-Nature
Swaps Link Global Ecology to Economy, Milwaukee J., Sept. 5, 1989, at IA.
211. Cody, supra note 157, at 5-6.
212. Sullivan, Interview with a "Debt-Swapper," Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 4, 1988, at 3.
213. The Nature Conservancy, International Program (undated and unpublished document avail-
able from The Nature Conservancy).
214. R. Sevilla, The Sevilla Proposal: Financial Mechanisms for Conservation (undated and
unpublished document available from The Nature Conservancy).
215. The Debt-for-Nature Option, SWAPS, Nov. 1988, at 8.
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decade.216 In addition to export revenues, forests provide tourism revenues. In
Costa Rica, tourism earns more foreign exchange than anything except coffee
and bananas.21 7 Tourism also creates employment.218 Finally, forested water-
sheds guarantee clean, stable water supplies for cities, industries, and power.
21 9
The worldwide population depends on tropical forests for medicines, rubber,
fibers, and hardwoods. 220 Forty percent of all medicines originate from natural
substances. 221 One quarter of the prescription drugs used in the United States are
derived from tropical forest plants.222 Forests also help control global warming.22 3
Perhaps the most important investment a conservation investor can make is in
the untapped or unknown LDC resources. Stein Hansen, consultant for the
Economics and Policy Division of the Environment Department of the World
Bank believes that economically, industrialized countries "are prepared to pay
for the preservation of some perhaps unknown resources . . . because they
believe this could be of great value to the world in the future. ' 224 Hansen
believes that the debtor countries have an increasingly scarce export in the
preservation of genetic diversity and the sustainable management of global
warming. 225 Unknown and unnamed species may harbor cures for diseases,
sources for food, or bases for new industries.226 Hansen's viewpoint is supported
by scientists' view that potential economic loss caused by environmental de-
struction is beyond computation because forests contain a vast gene bank in the
form of potential fruits, crops, and medicines.227
VII. The Future of Debt-for-Nature
Several ideas have been proposed to increase the impact of debt-for-nature
swaps. Senator Robert Kasten (R-Wisconsin) contends that "[w]hat we're doing
here now is not important in terms of amount . . . . We're putting together the
mechanism. Then it's a matter of working out more deals for different and larger
216. Ecologists Make Friends with Economists, EcONOMIST, Oct. 15, 1988, at 25 [hereinafter
Ecologists Make Friends).
217. B. Bramble, D. Burand, R. Curtis, D. Page, & M. Sweatman, A Brief Summary of Debt-
for-Nature Swaps (undated and unpublished memorandum available from The Nature Conservancy)
[hereinafter A Brief Summary].
218. J. Gibson & R. Curtis, supra note 112, at 27.
219. Letter to the Editor of Christianity and Crisis, dated May 16, 1988 (available from The
Nature Conservancy) [hereinafter Letter].
220. Cody, supra note 157, at 7.
221. Letter, supra note 219.
222. Ecologists Make Friends, supra note 216, at 25.
223. A Brief Summary, supra note 217.
224. S. Hansen, supra note 24, at 6.
225. Hansen suggests that a market should be created for the services of preserving these "ex-
ports." Id.
226. Letter, supra note 219.
227. Ecologists Make Friends, supra note 216, at 25.
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amounts." 228 Kasten advocates the idea of a debt-for-nature clearinghouse to
facilitate debt-for-nature exchanges. 229 Under this approach an MDB such as the
World Bank would serve as an information broker of financial and environmental
expertise. Private initiatives could "piggyback" World Bank projects. 230 Even
greater plans were suggested by Sir James Goldsmith at Prime Minister Thatch-
er's Greenhouse Seminar in 1989.231 Sir James suggested forming an interna-
tional company called "Forestco." He maintained that such a company could
finance deals as large as $50 billion. Forestco would write off a country's debt
at less than face value on the condition that forests be protected.
Another proposal comes from the Nature Conservancy, which suggests that an
international conservation sustainable development trust fund should be cre-
ated.232 The corpus of the trust would be bilateral debt notes supplied by AID
and/or other bilateral debt holders. An MDB or other multilateral entity would
serve as trustee. Finally, in 1988 an Environmental Consortium made up of
twenty nonprofit environmental organizations, published a draft copy of a plan
that called for multilateral organizations and commercial banks, "under the
guiding hand" of the United States Government to include in each debt-financing
agreement the element of environmental conservation. 233 A high-level adminis-
trative position or facility would oversee the program and would make LDCs
manage conservation properly in order to receive rescheduling. All of these
proposals indicate that the debt-for-nature swap can have a significant short-term
as well as long-term impact.
VIII. Conclusion
The debt-for-nature swap provides both a sound and a crucial investment. Debt-
ors and creditors alike have a stake in curbing environmental destruction. Debtor
LDCs that choose to borrow from the environment to achieve a short-term solution
to the debt crisis risk losing the resource bases necessary for future production and
export growth. They thereby sacrifice long-term economic stability.
Creditors need to realize that without long-term economic stability, the LDCs
will not be able to repay outstanding debt in the future. The problem is merely
delayed. In fact, LDC debt is likely to increase when unpaid interest payments
are added to the outstanding principal. In essence, a creditor that participates in
a debt-for-nature swap invests in the means for future LDC debt repayments. At
the same time, the creditor limits the amount of loan loss reserves it must set
aside, avoids writing off a debt, and in the United States, receives a tax break.
228. Culotta, supra note 210, at IA.
229. Weisskopf, Ecuador Gets Aid for Debt, Environment, Wash. Post, Apr. 6, 1989, at A20.
230. J. Gibson & R. Curtis, supra note 112, at 69.
231. How the West Can Stamp Out the Forest Fire, Daily Telegraph, Sept. 25, 1989, at 20.
232. J. Gibson & R. Curtis, supra note 112, at 58-59.
233. Environmentalists Ready Debt Proposal, Institutional Investor, Inc.; Bank Letter, Oct. 10,
1988, at 5.
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The worldwide population also has a stake in the preservation of the environ-
ment. It depends on LDC natural resources for medical research and for control
of global warming. Creditor governments have acknowledged their stake, as is
evidenced by the International Development and Finance Act of 1989 in the
United States and by the write-off of $405 million of Kenya's debt by the Federal
Republic of Germany.
Debt-for-nature swaps alone will not solve the debt crisis. They do however
attack it from several angles.
(1) They eliminate debt. The reduction so far may not be particularly signif-
icant, but the implementation of proposals such as a debt-for-nature clearing-
house and the integration of an environmental clause into all commercial bank
and MDB financing agreements could greatly increase the debt-for-nature swap's
impact.
(2) They enhance the ability of LDCs to meet future repayments by relieving
some of the pressure to deplete resources now and worry about the future later.
(3) They are a flexible method and are therefore available to incorporate into
a refinancing plan when other methods are not available because of clauses in
prior restructuring agreements or because of regulatory restrictions.
Furthermore, the debt-for-nature swap attacks the debt crisis without imping-
ing on an LDC's sovereignty. It allows the LDC to implement programs of its
own choice and to keep the investment "proceeds" within the country. There-
fore, the debt-for-nature swap is a very enticing alternative to the LDC and
should help dissuade it from completely defaulting.
The debt crisis arose in the 1970s, yet after over ten years of attempts to deal
with it no one solution has proven to be enough to resolve it. Long-term
economic stability is the key. LDCs will not achieve long-term economic sta-
bility without conservation, but conservation will not be implemented if LDCs
must use conservation dollars to service debt. The debt-for-nature swap is one
way to break this cycle, and therefore it should become a standard part of debt
renegotiations.
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